

A Sufficient Statistics Approach to Measuring Forward-Looking Welfare

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Introduction

- ▶ Really nice paper!
- ▶ Beautiful example of using theory to extract useful information (welfare) from individual/household-level data

Today's discussion

- ▶ Ariel presented results from a simple model for intuition and then presented the general environment
- ▶ Let me walk through an even simpler example
- ▶ Some questions and potential applications

Super simple example

- ▶ 2-period lived agents
- ▶ Rentiers finance consumption with initial wealth w
- ▶ Non-rentiers additionally have income y and face borrowing constraints
- ▶ CRRA utility

Rentier's problem

- ▶ Problem of rentier with initial wealth w can be written as

$$V_t^0(w) = \max_{c_t^0, c_{t+1}^1, a_{t+1}^1} u(c_t^0) + \beta u(c_{t+1}^1)$$

s.t. $p_t c_t^0 + a_{t+1}^1 = w$

$p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^1 = R_{t+1} a_{t+1}^1$

- ▶ With CRRA utility,

$$c_{t+1}^1 = \left(\beta R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1/\sigma} c_t^0$$

Rentier's solution

- ▶ Substitute in to budget constraint,

$$\begin{aligned} p_t c_t^0 + \frac{p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^1}{R_{t+1}} &= w \\ \Rightarrow p_t c_t^0 + \frac{p_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} \left(\beta R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1/\sigma} c_t^0 &= w \\ \Rightarrow p_t c_t^0 &= \underbrace{\left[1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}_{b_t^0} w \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Note that $\frac{b_{t+1}^1}{b_t^0} = \frac{1 - b_t^0}{b_t^0} = \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}}$

Money Metric

- ▶ The money metric welfare of household in period t with wealth w in terms of t_0 dollars is given by

$$\begin{aligned} u(c_t^0(w)) + \beta u(c_{t+1}^1(w)) &= u(c_{t_0}^0(\hat{u})) + \beta u(c_{t_0+1}^1(\hat{u})) \\ \Rightarrow \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(b_t^0 \frac{w}{p_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} + \beta \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(b_{t+1}^1 \frac{R_{t+1}w}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(b_{t_0}^0 \frac{\hat{u}}{p_{t_0}} \right)^{1-\sigma} + \beta \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(b_{t_0+1}^1 \frac{R_{t_0+1}\hat{u}}{p_{t_0+1}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \\ \Rightarrow \left(w \frac{b_t^0}{p_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[1 + \beta \left(\frac{b_{t+1}^1 R_{t+1} p_t}{b_t^0 p_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right] \\ &= \left(\hat{u} \frac{b_{t_0}^0}{p_{t_0}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[1 + \beta \left(\frac{b_{t_0+1}^1 R_{t_0+1} p_{t_0}}{b_{t_0}^0 p_{t_0+1}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Money Metric

- ▶ Substitute $\frac{b_{t+1}^1}{b_t^0} = \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}}$ to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(w \frac{b_t^0}{p_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(R_{t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \right] \\ &= \left(\hat{u} \frac{b_{t_0}^0}{p_{t_0}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \underbrace{\left[1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} \left(R_{t_0+1} \frac{p_{t_0}}{p_{t_0+1}} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \right]}_{b_{t_0}^0} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Taking logs and reorganize:

$$\log(\hat{u}) = \log(w) - \log\left(\frac{p_t}{p_{t_0}}\right) + \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \log\left(\frac{b_t^0}{b_{t_0}^0}\right)$$

Special version of Proposition 1

- ▶ The money metric welfare of household in period t with wealth w in terms of t_0 dollars is given by

$$\log(\hat{u}) = \log(w)$$

$-\log\left(\frac{p_t}{p_{t_0}}\right)$: adjusts for price level differences

$+\frac{1}{1 - EIS} \log\left(\frac{b_t^0}{b_{t_0}^0}\right)$: adjusts for intertemporal prices

- ▶ If $EIS = \frac{1}{\sigma} > 1$, $b_t^0 < b_{t_0}^0$ reflects better savings opportunities, requiring compensation

Non-rentier's problem

- ▶ Problem of non-rentier with initial wealth w and income y

$$\begin{aligned} V_t^0(w, y) &= \max_{c_t^0, c_{t+1}^1, a_{t+1}^1} u(c_t^0) + \beta u(c_{t+1}^1) \\ &\text{s.t. } p_t c_t^0 + a_{t+1}^1 = w \\ &\quad p_{t+1} c_{t+1}^1 = y + R_{t+1} a_{t+1}^1 \\ &\quad a_{t+1}^1 \geq -\bar{a} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ If borrowing constraint is non-binding,

$$\begin{aligned} b_{n,t}^0 &= b_{r,t}^0 \\ \hat{u} &= w + \frac{y}{R_{t+1}} \end{aligned}$$

Money metric for non-rentier

- ▶ If borrowing constraint is binding,


$$b_{n,t}^0 = \frac{w + \bar{a}}{w + \frac{y}{R_{t+1}}} < b_{r,t}^0$$
$$\hat{u} < w + \frac{y}{R_{t+1}}$$

- ▶ It is straightforward to show that


$$\frac{\partial \hat{u}}{\partial \bar{a}} \geq 0$$

meaning that relaxing borrowing constraints improve the money-metric welfare

Kinked budget constraint



Money metric welfare non-rentier




A question, an observation rather

- ▶ I have an old paper (dormant until recently) with Chris Telmer, where we similarly use theory to extract information from household consumption/savings data.
- ▶ Similar idea/approach, but very different set of assumptions/implications
- ▶ We use a benchmark life-cycle portfolio-choice model to solve for wedges (à la Chari/Kehoe/McGrattan; Hsieh/Klenow) to rationalize household consumption/savings/risky allocations (PSID)
- ▶ Heterogeneous wedges can reflect heterogeneous preferences for discounting/risk, borrowing constraints, heterogeneous returns, etc.


Risky wedge

- ▶ Risky wedge is very heterogenous across households




Saving wedge

- ▶ Savings wedge is also very heterogenous across households




Risky wedge and education

- ▶ Risky wedge does not depend too much on age and education



Saving wedge and education

- ▶ Savings wedge not too dependent on working age vs. retirees
- ▶ Education seems to be an important determinant



Main takeaway

- ▶ From the lens of our analysis, savings wedge is quite heterogeneous
- ▶ This could reflect different savings opportunities, different discount factors, etc.
- ▶ How does this affect our interpretation of the non-rentier welfare results?

Wishlist and final thoughts

- ▶ An illustrative example that provides intuition for the non-rentier results would be very helpful. Perhaps a simple two-period model with non-homothetic preferences.
- ▶ How does welfare from job loss depend on education, income, and wealth etc., in addition to age.
- ▶ Job loss during aggregate downturn versus idiosyncratic job loss
- ▶ Measure the impact of trade (connect to the China trade shock literature)
- ▶ Measure the distribution of welfare of the Great Recession?
- ▶ Great thought-provoking paper, learned a lot!

Thanks everyone for sticking around, and especially to our
amazing hosts!